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Thompson v. 
Keohane: 
STATE 
DETERMINATIONS 
OF "IN CUSTODY" 
FOR MIRANDA 
PURPOSES ARE 
NOT 
PRESUMPTIVELY 
CORRECT UNDER 
28 U.S.c. § 2254(d) 
AND ARE SUBJECT 
TO FEDERAL 
REVIEW. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In a seven to two deci-
sion, the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Thompson v. 
Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995), 
held that a state court determi-
nation of whether a suspect was 
"in custody" is not afforded a 
presumption of correctness un-
der28 U.S.c. § 2254(d)(1994), 
and was subject to review by a 
federal habeas court. The Court 
found that such decisions do 
not fall within the constraints of 
a factual determination, but in-
stead resolve a mixed question 
of law and fact. Furthermore, 
the Court stated that the federal 
bench was as qualified as a state 
trial court to make determina-
tions of whether a suspect was 
"in custody" for Miranda warn-
mg purposes. 
On September 10, 1986, 
two hunters discovered the 
corpse of a woman floating in a 
gravel pit lake. The Alaska 
state po lice broadcast a descrip-
tion of the deceased woman, 
and Carl Thompson ("Thomp-
son") notified the police that 
the description fit his ex-
wife, who had been missing for 
approximately one month. The 
remains of Dixie Thompson 
were positively identified 
through the use of dental 
records. On September 15, 
1986, the police asked Thomp-
son to visit their headquarters, 
ostensibly to identify some per-
sonal effects, but in actuality 
for questioning about the mur-
der. 
Upon arriving, Thomp-
son was questioned extensively 
for two hours by two unarmed 
troopers. At no time was 
Thompson given a Miranda 
warning. The troopers told Th-
ompson that officers were exe-
cuting a search warrant at his 
house and that his truck was 
about to be searched pursuant 
to a second warrant. The troop-
ers' questioning continued, and 
Thompson eventually con-
fessed to murdering Dixie Th-
ompson. Although Thompson 
was allowed to leave the sta-
tion, he was placed under for-
mal arrest a short while later. 
At trial, the court dis-
missed Thompson's motion to 
suppress the confession with-
out holding an evidentiary hear-
ing. The trial court ruled that 
Thompson was not "in custo-
dy" for Miranda purposes; thus, 
a Miranda warning was not re-
quired. The trial court, with 
some hesitancy, found that Th-
ompson arrived at the station 
voluntarily, was free to depart 
at any time, and was not arrest-
ed at the conclusion of his inter-
rogation. Subsequently, Th-
ompson was convicted of first-
degree murder and tampering 
with evidence. 
The Court of Appeals 
of Alaska affirmed the trial 
court's decision, and the Alas-
ka Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of 
Alaska denied Thompson's writ 
of habeas corpus, holding that 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) granted a 
presumption of correctness to 
the state court's conclusion of 
Thompson's "in custody" 
claim. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court, basing its de-
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cision on circuit precedent. The 
Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari to de-
termine whether state court "in 
custody" decisions are entitled 
to a presumption of correctness 
under § 2254( d) or are such 
decisions mixed questions of 
law and fact subject to review 
by a federal habeas court. By 
resolving this issue, the Court 
would settle conflict among the 
circuit courts. 
In beginning its analy-
sis, the Court noted that § 
2254( d) '''was an almost verba-
tim codification of the standards 
delineated in Townsendv. Sain, 
372 U. S. 293 (1963), for deter-
mining when a district court 
must hold an evidentiary hear-
ing before acting on a habeas 
petition. '" Thompson, 116 S. 
Ct. at 463 (quoting Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 111 
(1985)). The Townsend Court 
held that the federal bench 
should accept the facts found 
by the state court if the habeas 
petitioner had received a fair 
hearing. Id. at 463-64 (citing 
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318). 
Additionally, Townsend de-
fined a "factual issue" as "'ba-
sic, primary, or historical fact, '" 
in the sense of an event summa-
ry that is determinative of its 
narrator's credibility. Id. at 464 
(quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 
309, n.6, quoting Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 
(1953)). In contrast, mixed 
questions of law and fact, re-
quiring the application of law 
to a factual context, are not "fac-
tual issues" under this standard. 
Id. (citing Townsend, 372 U.S. 
62 - U. Bait. L.F. /26.3 
at 309, n.6). The Court reaf-
firmed that § 2254( d) applies 
only to factual issues, not to so-
called mixed questions of law 
and fact. Id. 
N ext, the Court de-
scribed the two decisional lines 
comprising § 2254( d) jurispru-
dence. Competency to stand 
trial and juror impartiality are 
questions extending beyond a 
"factual issue," yet are within § 
2254(d). Id. at 464-65. The 
Court held that a trial judge's 
appraisal of witness credibility 
regarding such questions is su-
perior, and is to be accorded 
"'presumptive weight. '" Id. at 
465 (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. 
at 114). Issues of law such as 
voluntariness of confession, ef-
fectiveness of counsel, and con-
flict of interest, however, are 
outside § 2254( d) jurisdiction. 
Id. While the factual issues of 
such questions are within § 
2254( d), their "'uniquely legal 
dimension'" removed them 
from the presumption of cor-
rectness under § 2254( d). Id. 
(quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 
116). 
Applying this frame-
work, the Court concluded that 
a state trial court "in custody" 
determination for Miranda pur-
poses is outside the presump-
tion of correctness afforded by 
§ 2254( d). Id. In fashioning an 
"in custody" determination, the 
Court believed two inquiries 
were essential. Id. The first 
inquiry was distinctly factual 
as it probed the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation 
of the suspect, and is afforded 
correctness under § 2254( d). Id. 
The second inquiry, however, 
required determination of 
whether a reasonable person 
would believe that he was not 
"at liberty to terminate the in-
terrogation" by departing. Id. 
The Court believed that com-
bining these inquiries created a 
mixed question of law and fact 
subject to independent federal 
review. Id. The Court stated 
that trial court credibility deter-
minations were not dispositive 
to the second inquiry, because 
"the trial court does not have 
first-person vantage on wheth-
er a defendant was in custody 
for Miranda purposes." !d. at 
465-66 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
The Court distinguished 
"in custody" determinations 
from other trial court decisions. 
The Court reasoned that indi-
vidualized determinations of 
juror bias or competency to 
stand trial are unlikely to carry 
precedential weight. Id. at 466. 
In contrast, the Court noted that 
"in custody" decisions do carry 
precedential weight and influ-
ence future determinations. !d. 
The Court concluded that a state 
court is not '''in an appreciably 
better position than the federal 
habeas court to make [the ulti-
mate] determination'" of 
whether a suspect was "in cus-
tody" for Miranda warning pur-
poses. Id. (quoting Miller, 474 
U.S. at 117). 
In a strongly worded 
dissent, Justice Thomas, with 
whom the Chief Justice joined, 
believed that a state trial court 
judge is in a superior position to 
determine whether a suspect 
was "in custody" for Miranda 
warning purposes. Id. at 467. 
Justice Thomas reasoned that 
many of the trial judge's subtle 
assessments regarding credibil-
ity are "difficult to reduce to 
writing" and not likely to be 
recorded for purposes of ap-
peal, thus leaving an incom-
plete record for federal habeas 
courts. !d. at 469. Because 
state courts are fully empow-
ered to interpret federal law, 
Justice Thomas argued they 
should be presumed to have 
applied federal law as faithfully 
as any federal court, absent any 
indication to the contrary. Id. 
(citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
113 S. Ct. 1710,1721 (1993) 
and Withrow v. Williams, 113 
S. Ct. 1745, 1770 (1993». 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The Court believes that 
the overall result of Thompson 
v. Keohane will serve the inter-
ests of law enforcement with-
out trampling upon the protec-
tion of the right against self-
incrimination. Although the 
lack of an evidentiary hearing 
on Thompson's suppression 
motion could logically lead the 
Court to conclude that the re-
quirements of § 2254( d) were 
not satisfied, the dissent is more 
persuasive concerning the over-
all effect of the holding. A 
sterile trial record is no substi-
tute for a live defendant when 
making a determination of 
whether a suspect reasonably 
believed that he was "in custo-
dy" during police questioning. 
The trial judge is in the best 
position to make this decision, 
and should be accorded great 
deference in the absence of § 
2254( d) violations. Law en-
forcement in Maryland would 
do well to revisit its investiga-
tive and interrogative tech-
niques to ensure that they do 
not run afoul of Thompson. 
- Paul J. Wilson 
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